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EMPLOYMENT LAW
INTRODUCTION
The area of employment law continues to expand and develop at a
rapid rate. During this survey period,' the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit published over one hundred decisions concerning
employment law. In an era of "employment at will," an employee seem-
ingly has little recourse when terminated in bad faith, such as in retalia-
tion for parallel discrimination claims, or for speech harmful to the em-
ployer. As exceptions to the employment at will concept develop,' how-
ever, courts increasingly hold employers responsible for improper termi-
nation decisions Although the Tenth Circuit has addressed a number of
issues within the larger category of employment law during this survey
period, this survey will focus on recent developments related to retalia-
tory discharge claims-in particular, retaliatory discharge claims result-
ing from protected speech and those derived from parallel statutory ac-
tions. Part I will address general concepts of employment implicated in
retaliatory discharge claims, laying the foundation for Part II, which dis-
cusses recent decisions in the Tenth Circuit and other circuits in the area
of retaliatory discharge.
I. RETALIATORY DISCHARGE--GENERAL CONCEPTS
A. Common Law Concept of Employment at Will
Traditionally, the common law concept of employment at will per-
mitted an employer, absent agreement to the contrary, to discharge an
employee "at any time, for any reason, or for no reason at all." Today,
American courts essentially preserve and frequently recognize this con-
cept,' yet judicially developed exceptions have eroded an employer's
ability to terminate an employee without cause.7 While the common law
1. The survey addresses decisions rendered by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit between September 1, 1997, and August 31, 1998.
2. Cf. Mark A. Fahleson, The Public Policy Exception to Employment at Will-When Should
Courts Defer to the Legislature?, 72 NEB. L. REV. 956, 960-61 (1993).
3. See John Michael Anderson, Tenth Circuit Survey, Employment Law, 74 DENV. U. L.
REV. 455,455 (1997).
4. Jennifer Staley, Comment, Professional Responsibility-The "Snitch Rule, " DR 1-103(A),
Meets the Employment-at-Will Doctrine: Weider v. Skala, 19 J. CORP. L. 353, 353 (1994); cf. Payne
v. Western & At. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 520 (1884) ("The law leaves employer and employe[e] to
make their own contracts; and these, when made, it will enforce; beyond this it does not go. Either
the employer or employe[e] may terminate the relation at will, and the law will not interfere .... ).
5. See Michael D. Wulfsohn, Comment, Martin Marietta v. Lorenz: Palpable Public Policy
and the Superfluous Sixth Element, 70 DENV. U. L. REV. 589, 591-92 (1993).
6. Cf. Mark E. Walker, Case Comment, Workers' Compensation: Florida's Resistance to
Nonstatutory Limits to the Employment-at-WiU Doctrine, 43 FLA. L. REV. 583, 584 & n.13 (1991).
7. See Daniel P. Westman, Implied Limitations on Employer's Exercise of Discretion in At-
Will Setting, 558 PLI LITIG. & ADMIN. 605, 607 (1997).
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doctrine of employment at will ostensibly provided equal protection for
both the employer and the employee, it became increasingly apparent
that employers, generally in a position of greater power, benefited from
this concept far more than employees who received little protection from
discriminatory employment practices and were given little recourse.
1. History of At-Will Employment
The doctrine of at-will employment finds its roots in the English con-
cept of servitude,8 which grew from the law regulating the relationship
between master and servant. The law of master and servant afforded some
protection for the employee.! For example, it provided a one-year period
of employment, during which the master could not terminate the servant;
0
and in some circumstances, the employee could seek damages in the
amount of wages he would have earned during the one-year period."
2. American Adoption of Employment at Will
The adoption of the American concept of "at-will" employment "can
be traced to Horace Gay Wood's treatise... [which indicated that] an
employment contract was presumed to be terminable at will unless its
duration had been specified by the parties."'2 With the advent of the
American concept3 came the elimination of the few protections afforded
by the English concept of servitude."' Although the concept as expressed
by Wood lacked support in case law,'" it "was welcomed by American
courts for its laissez-faire, free-market approach to employment con-
tractual relationships."'" Thus, the American twist on the concept of ser-
8. See Wulfsohn, supra note 5, at 591; see also Fahleson, supra note 2, at 959-60.
9. See Fahleson, supra note 2, at 960; Wulfsohn, supra note 5, at 591 (emphasizing that the
original concept presumed a one-year hiring).
10. See Cornelius J. Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Understanding the Develop-
ment of the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 WASH. L. REV. 719, 721 (1991); see also Fahleson,
supra note 2, at 959; Wulfsohn, supra note 5, at 591.
t1. See CHARLES MANLEY SMrTH, ESQ., A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF MASTER AND SERVANT
93 (Blackstone Publ'g Co. 1886).
12. Fahleson, supra note 2, at 960; see also Peck, supra note 10, at 722.
13. See Wulfsohn, supra note 5, at 591; see also Staley, supra note 4, at 356.
14. See Wulfsohn, supra note 5, at 591; see also Staley, supra note 4, at 356. American courts
adopted the concept of at-will employment sometime after 1877. See Wulfsohn, supra note 5,' at 591;
see also Staley, supra note 4, at 356.
15. Cf Fahleson, supra note 2, at 960; Peck, supra note 10, at 722; Wulfsohn, supra note 5, at
591-92.
16. Fahleson, supra note 2, at 960; see also Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 337
S.E.2d 213, 221 (S.C. 1985) ("Legal scholars and opinion writers agree that the doctrine, if not
expressly created to subserve the laissez-faire climate of the late 19th century, has had the effect of
doing so."); Daniel A. Mathews, Comment, A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged
Employee, 26 HASTINGS LJ. 1435, 1438 (1975) (stating that the "rule was thoroughly consistent
with the deeply rooted laissez-faire convictions of the time").
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vitude reflected the growing trend toward a free market economy by in-
corporating free market principles into employment practices.'7
In practice, at-will employment favors the employer." While the at-
will concept permits an employer to terminate an employee for any sub-
jective reason, it is arguably less likely that an employee might leave a
job for an equally subjective reason. In general, employees are replace-
able, while jobs are much more difficult to replace. 9 As such, the at-will
concept of employment, which ostensibly provides equal protection,"
actually creates an atmosphere generally favorable to the employer while
providing little, if any, protection for the employee.
3. Creation of Exceptions to At-Will Employment
Prior to 1970 few avenues existed through which an employee could
seek redress for unjust termination.' In fact, some commentators have
noted that the United States is one of the few places in the western world
allowing an employee such scant recourse.' Exceptions to the at-will
doctrine have become increasingly available in both number and scope,'
17. Cf Wulfsohn, supra note 5, at 591 (describing how the American concept of at-will em-
ployment "allowed either the employer or the employee to terminate the employment contract at any
time for good cause, bad cause or no cause"). See generally ROBERT L. HEILBRONER & LEsTER C.
THUROW, ECONOMICS EXPLAINED 11-24 (1987) (explaining the emergence and development of free
market economies).
18. See, e.g., Peck, supra note 10, at 720-21 (describing how New England textile employers
adopted the policy of firing employees without notice while requiring notice from an employee
intending to quit); see also Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L.
REV. 947 (1984).
19. Although unemployment rates have remained constant at about 4.5% for the past year, and
total employment rose by 814,000 in January of 1999, the total labor force increased by 67% in
January. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Situation Summary (February 5, 1999)
<http://stats.bls.gov/news.releaselempsit.nes.htm>. Further, according to the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, between 1991 and 1995 roughly 37% of both men and women experienced one period of unem-
ployment. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Number of Jobs, Labor Market Experience, and Earnings
Growth: Results From a Longitudinal Survey Summary (June 24, 1998) <httpJ/stats.bls.gov/
news.release/nlsoy.nws.htm>. Of those who experienced at least one unemployment period, over
29% reported being unemployed for three or more periods. See id.
20. Wulfsohn, supra note 5, at 591.
21. Cf. Staley, supra note 4, at 356-57. Prior to 1970, three general categories of employees
had some statutory redress: civil service employees, employees governed by collective bargaining
agreements, and employees claiming class-based discrimination. See id.
22. Cf. Janice R. Bellace, A Right of Fair Dismissal: Enforcing a Statutory Guarantee, 16 U.
MICm. J.L. REFORM 207, 208-09 (1983) ("The United States stands virtually alone among Western
industrialized countries in failing to provide a remedy for employees wrongfully dismissed .... The
American practice of not guaranteeing workers a right of fair dismissal diverges from that of other
industrialized countries."); Fahleson, supra note2, at 959 n.9 (noting that Canada and most Western
European countries have provided protection for the employee against "socially unwarranted dis-
missals," such as requiring notice prior to discharge, shifting the burden on the employer to prove
that a discharge was legitimate, and mandating predismissal hearings).
23. See Staley, supra note 4, at 354; Walker supra note 6, at 584; see also Maureen S. Binetti
et al, The Employment-at-Will Doctrine: Have Its Exceptions Swallowed the Rule? Common Law
Limitations Upon an Employer's Control over Employees-at-Will, 581 PLI IG. & ADMIN. 447,
457 (1998); Fahleson, supra note 2, at 960-61.
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thus providing avenues through which terminated employees may obtain
a remedy.' Such exceptions, which vary significantly among the states,'
include "implied contracts (based upon oral promises, handbooks, or the
parties' course of dealing); violation of public policy; and the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing."' Some legal scholars argue that
these remedial exceptions have virtually eliminated the doctrine of em-
ployment at will;27 however, many courts remain hesitant to recognize
such exceptions.'
B. Wrongful Termination
Wrongful termination actions are based on statutory provisions and
judicially created exceptions to the doctrine of employment at will.' An
employee may bring these actions under both federal and state law.' This
survey focuses on wrongful termination actions arising under the public
policy exception. In the early 1980s, the New Jersey Supreme Court,. in
the pivotal case of Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., clearly ar-
ticulated the creation of the public policy exception as a cause of action
for wrongful discharge. The court stated that "an employee has a cause
of action for wrongful discharge when the discharge is contrary to a clear
mandate of public policy."32
1. Public Policy Exception
The public policy exception for a wrongful termination claim pro-
vides a remedy for employees terminated while exercising a legal right,
performing a legal duty, refusing to commit an illegal act, or "whistle
blowing."33 These activities may be grouped into the more general cate-
24. Cf Fahleson, supra note 2, at 960.
25. See Staley, supra note 4, at 357-58.
26. Binetti, supra note 23, at 457.
27. See id.
28. See, e.g., Grant v. Butler, 590 So. 2d 254, 256-57 (Ala. 1991); Troy v. Interfinancial, Inc.,
320 S.E.2d 872, 877 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984); Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874, 877
(Miss. 1981); Waldermeyer v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 767 F. Supp. 989, 994 (E.D. Mo. 1991);
DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 360 So. 2d 134, 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); see also
Walker, supra note 6, at 584. But see Peter A. Muhic, Recent Decision, Labor Law-Drug Testing
and the Employment At-Will Doctrine: Third Circuit Defines New Cause of Action for Wrongful
Discharge-Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1992), 66 TEMP. L. REv. 327,
327 (1993). See generally MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 3 (1988).
29. See Fahleson, supra note 2, at 960; W. Muzette Hill, Employment Practices Liability: The
Other Year 2000 Problem?, 584 PLI LITIG. & ADMIN. 293, 301 (1998).
30. See Hill, supra note 29, at 299; cf Anderson, supra note 3, at 455 (discussing the role of
congressional statutes enacted to protect employees).
31. 417A.2d505,512(NJ. 1980).
32. Pierce, 417 A.2d at 512.
33. Cf Hill, supra note 29, at 301.
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gories of (1) refusal to commit an unlawful act, (2) fulfilling a public
obligation, and (3) exercising a right or privilege.'
Sources and types of public policy are many;' however, in an at-
tempt to "forward a clearly articulated public policy,"' courts have lim-
ited the sources from which a public policy exception may emanate?7
Courts may differ in their understanding of public policy, 8 but in general,
"public policy includes general notions of goodness, justness and absten-
tion from activity which is injurious to the public good."39 As with
wrongful termination actions, both state and federal law provide sources
of public policy,' including constitutional and statutory provisions at
both levels."' Courts may look to "general public standards and morals,
without requiring plaintiffs to point to a specific source of positive law."
In Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,'3 the New Jersey Supreme
Court attempted to define sources of public policy when it stated that
"the sources of public policy include legislation; administrative rules,
regulations or decisions; and judicial decisions. In certain instances, a
professional code of ethics may contain an expression of public policy.'"
Despite this definition, the nature of "public policy," as well as "public
concern," remains nebulous because these categories are extremely broad
and support differing interpretations. The increasing number of claims3
arising in this area indicates that courts intend not only to promote mat-
ters and values of public concern but to protect them.
34. See Fahleson, supra note 2, at 964-66.
35. Cf id. at 967.
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 968.
39. Id. at 967; cf Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 261 P.2d 721, 726 (Cal.
1953).
40. See Fahleson, supra note 2, at 967-68.
41. See id.
42. Id. at 968; cf, e.g., Palmateer v. Int'l. Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 880 (111. 1981)
(holding that "[n]o specific constitutional or statutory provision requires a citizen to take an active
part in the ferreting out and prosecution of crime, but public policy nevertheless favors citizen crime-
fighters").
43. 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980).
44. Pierce, 417 A.2d at 512.
45. A number of cases address the many exceptions to at-will employment founded in differ-
ent sources of public policy. See, e.g., Roberts v. Roadway Express, Inc., 149 F.3d 1098, 1103 (10th
Cir. 1998); Curtis v. Oklahoma City Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 147 F.3d 1200, 1205 (10th Cir. 1998);
Cragg v. City of Osawatomie, 143 F.3d 1343, 1345 (10th Cir. 1998); Radwan v. Beecham Lab., 850
F.2d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 1988); Tameny v. At. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1336-37 (Cal. 1980);
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 261 P.2d 721, 726 (Cal. 1953); Martin Marietta
Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 108 (Colo. 1992); Lathrop v. Entenmann's, Inc., 770 P.2d 1367,
1373 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 389 (Conn. 1980);
Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 880; Pierce, 417 A.2d at 512; Madden v. Omega Optical, Inc., 683 A.2d
386, 391 (Vt. 1996).
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2. History of the Public Policy Exception
California courts were at the forefront of recognizing the public pol-
icy exception to at-will employment. ' In 1959, the landmark case of Pe-
termann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 396,"' created
the framework for the public policy exception ' when the court deter-
mined that certain societal values mandate the protection of employees
from unfair action by disproportionately powerful employers. Petermann
surveyed definitions of "public policy," recognizing it as a "principle of
law which holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a ten-
dency to be injurious to the public or against the public good," or that
which "contravenes good morals or any established interests of
society." A series of cases in the 1970s provided the "framework of the
types of employer actions that violate 'public policy.""' They established
the foundation for causes of action currently recognized as retaliatory
discharge in violation of public policy-that is, discharge contrary to a
core societal value." These cases "recognized that strict adherence to the
at-will doctrine could bring potential harm to society in general." 3 Ac-
cordingly, the public policy exception grew from a general concern over
the erosion of core societal values caused by the at-will concept of em-
ployment. Thus, although at-will employment provided certain freedoms
for both the employer and the employee, it became evident that restraints
were necessary to prevent the potential exploitation of employees.
C. Retaliatory Discharge
1. Retaliatory Discharge As a Public Policy Exception
The public policy exception seeks to protect employees from a re-
taliatory termination resulting from their involvement, or lack of in-
volvement, in activities generally considered valuable to society and
worthy of protection. Such activities include exercising a legal right,
46. See Wulfsohn, supra note 5, at 593; see also Westman, supra note 7, at 609.
47. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
48. Petermann, 344 P.2d at 27.
49. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 261 P.2d 721,
726 (Cal. 1953)).
50. Id.; cf. Wulfsohn, supra note 5, at 594.
51. Wulfsohn, supra note 5, at 594; see, e.g., Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d
425, 428 (Ind. 1973) (creating an exception for retaliatory discharge); Cloutier v. Great Adl. & Pac.
Tea Co., 436 A.2d 1140, 1144 (N.H. 1981) (finding that violation of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 constituted a violation of public policy); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d
549, 551 (N.H. 1974) (ruling that a breach of employment contract occurs when termination "is
motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation"); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (Or.
1975) (creating exception for employee discharged after fulfilling jury duty); Harless v. First Nat'l
Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275-76 (W. Va. 1978) (creating an exception for whistleblowing).
52. Cf. Binetti, supra note 23, at 503 (citing Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 686-87 (Cal.
1992), overruled by Green v. Ralee Eng'g Co., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (Cal. 1998)).
53. Wulfsohn, supra note 5, at 597.
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refusing to commit an illegal act, or fulfilling a public obligation. ' For
example, in Dudewicz v. Norris-Schmid, Inc.," the manager of an auto
dealership assaulted an employee and the employee filed criminal
charges.' The employee, Dudewicz, alleged that the owner ordered him
to withdraw the complaint or face termination. Dudewicz ultimately lost
his job"7 after he refused to drop the complaint. The court found that
Dudewicz had the right to file a criminal complaint regarding an incident
of criminal assault in the workplace without fear of losing his job. 8 The
court stated that retaliatory discharge "infer[s] a motive of the em-
ployer's desire to 'get even' with the employee for the employee's
words, acts, refusals or omissions to act."5"
It is important to note that a parallel statutory claim, such as one
arising under Title VII carries an additional hurdle to the employee
seeking to successfully assert a claim of wrongful discharge because the
remedies provided by the statute may preempt any other wrongful dis-
charge claim. Although this issue will not be discussed in depth in this
survey, the frequent statutory preemption of other claims arising from
discriminatory activity requires individuals to evaluate whether a statute
provides the "exclusive remedy" for such activities.'
2. Retaliatory Discharge in Violation of Title VII
An employer may not terminate an employee in retaliation for cer-
tain employment discrimination claims. Title V116' prevents retaliatory
discharge actions resulting from a complaint against an employer on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 2 The following cases
illustrate both statutory and public policy claims. In Roberts v. Roadway
54. See Fahleson, supra note 2, at 964-66; see also Binetti supra 23, at 504-11.
55. 503 N.W.2d 645 (Mich. 1993).
56. Dudewicz, 503 N.W.2d at 646.
57. The parties disputed whether the company fired Dudewicz or whether he voluntarily
resigned. See id. While the court did not specifically address this dispute, the court's analysis clearly
indicates that it considered the separation to be a termination. See id. at 646-50.
58. See id.
59. Wulfsohn, supra note 5, at 609. While Dudewicz provides an example of retaliatory dis-
charge for both an act and a refusal to act, Cragg v. City of Osawatomie, 143 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir.
1998), discussed later, provides a clear example of retaliation for words spoken. In that case, Cragg
lost his job for publicly voicing his opinion of individuals running for public office. See Cragg, 143
F.3d at 1345; see also infra notes 70-100 and accompanying text (discussing the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Cragg).
60. Binetti, supra note 23, at 513. For example, the court in Dudewicz ultimately denied the
availability of the plaintiffs public policy claim because Michigan's Whistleblowers' Protection Act
pre-empted such an action. See Dudewicz, 503 N.W.2d at 650 ("A public policy claim is sustain-
able ... only where there also is not an applicable statutory prohibition against discharge in retalia-
tion for the conduct at issue.").
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1994).
62. See id.; see also Anderson, supra note 3, at 456; Jennifer A. Nemec, Comment, Yniguez v.
Arizonans for Official English: Free Speech May Have Lost the Battle, But in the End It Will Win
the War, 22 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 117, 127 (1998).
1999]
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Express, Inc.," an employee complained to the national headquarters of
racial harassment by fellow employees. Following these allegations, lo-
cal supervisors subjected the complaining employee to a number of dis-
ciplinary actions and eventually terminated him. The employee alleged a
retaliatory discharge in violation of a valid public policy and stated a
claim under Title VII. Similarly, in Curtis v. Oklahoma City Public
Schools Board of Education," an employee filed a discrimination claim
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), but was
terminated before the EEOC hearing; and, as in Roberts, the employee
eventually alleged retaliatory discharge in violation of both public policy
and Title VII. Title VII protection is contingent upon "'which party's
explanation of the employer's motivation [the court] believes."' If the
court determines that the employer used the parallel statutory claim as a
reason for termination, the employee may receive protection.' Alterna-
tively, should the court determine that circumstances justified the termi-
nation, the employee should not receive protection." The burden of per-
suasion in a claim of retaliation in violation of Title VII lies with the
plaintiff.' Further, courts consider the sufficiency of statutory remedies
in the context of parallel claims.
II. RETALIATORY DISCHARGE-CASE DISCUSSION
A. Background
Public policy exceptions to at-will employment developed to protect
and further core goals and values of society. Retaliatory discharge cases
by their nature arise under common law, and courts in such cases have
the difficult task of balancing these societal interests. Because these ele-
ments lack strict definition, courts frequently have little guidance in de-
termining what qualifies as a valid public interest. A court maintains the
powerful position of deciding which values society wants protected and,
when a discrepancy arises, which values are more important. For exam-
ple, a court may consider the important competing interests of the need
for strong government versus a right to freedom of speech. The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals recently decided three cases which present this
63. 149 F.3d 1098 (10th Cir. 1998).
64. 147 F.3d 1200(10th Cir. 1998).
65. See Curtis, 147 F.3d at 1207-09.
66. Love v. REIMAX of Am., Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 386 (10th Cir. 1984) (quoting United States
Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)).
67. See, e.g., Love, 738 F.2d at 386 (finding employer's dissatisfaction with employee's per-
formance to be a pretext). Some commentators have noted that claims based on discriminatory
conduct will "fail because of statutory preemption." Binetti, supra note 23, at 513. "However, some
courts allow a public policy discharge claim, even if there is also a statutory remedy. The key usu-
ally is whether the statutory remedy is deemed exclusive." Id.
68. Cf., e.g., Curtis, 147 F.3d at 1217 (holding that the Title VII claim was properly dismissed
due to evidence in record justifying employer).
69. See Love, 738 F.3d at 385-86.
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need for balancing. Although factual differences exist, in each situation
the court balanced the relevant interests in determining which interest
should prevail-a difficult task because of the delicate nature of the in-
terests involved.
B. Retaliatory Discharge for Protected Activity
1. Tenth Circuit-Cragg v. City of Osawatomie'
a. Case History
John Cragg, a terminated city police chief, brought action against the
City of Osawatomie, Kansas, alleging breach of contract and retaliatory
discharge in violation of the First Amendment.' The United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Kansas entered summary judgment for the
city.72 On appeal, Mr. Cragg raised five issues for relief, three of which
the court did not address." The two issues that the Tenth Circuit re-
viewed were, first, whether the district court failed to properly apply the
First Amendment balancing test required by Pickering v. Board of Edu-
cation," and second, whether the district court's interpretation of Kan-
sas's law was in error with regard to Mr. Cragg's contract claim.' The
Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. 6
b. Facts
For over twenty years, John Cragg worked as the Osawatomie police
chief." Prior to a city election, the city manager questioned Chief Cragg
concerning the possibility that certain candidates for city council had
felony convictions 8 and whether it was legal for a convicted felon to hold
70. 143 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998).
71. See Cragg v. City of Osawatomie, No. 95-2492-JWL, 1996 WL 707108, at *2 (D. Kan.
Nov. 8 1996), affid in part, rev'd in part, 143 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998).
72. See Cragg, 1996 WL 707108, at *5.
73. See Cragg, 143 F.3d at 1345.
74. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); see Cragg, 143 F.3d at 1345. The
Supreme Court, in Pickering, asserted that "the problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between
the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees." Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. One commentator has noted:
[Tihe Pickering decision appeared to finally make clear that the government's interest in
regulating an employee's speech is only strong enough to overcome the employee's First
Amendment right when the employee's speech impedes or interferes with the efficiency
of serving that part of the public that the employee has a duty to serve.
James G. Fahey, United States v. National Treasury Employees Union: Restrictions on Free Speech
of Government Employees and the Rebalancing of Pickering, 15 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 555, 561
(1996).
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a position on the city council."9 Chief Cragg investigated the individuals
and the legal matters involved, discovering that three of the candidates
for office were convicted felons and that convicted felons may legally
hold office unless they are on probation or serving a sentence.' Chief
Cragg informed the city manager and then placed a television advertise-
ment on local cable television urging voters to choose their candidates
wisely.8 The advertisement did not indicate that Mr. Cragg was the chief
of police.' During a later recall election, Chief Cragg placed a sign on
his front lawn urging voters to "vote no on recall."8 Eventually, the
newly appointed City Manager terminated Chief Cragg's employment
prompting Mr. Cragg to bring an action under the theory of retaliatory
discharge." Mr. Cragg alleged that the city terminated his employment in
retaliation for his political activities: the television advertisement and the
lawn sign. He also alleged that the termination violated his rights under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments."
c. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding that
Mr. Cragg's interest in free speech outweighed the city's interest in
functional efficiency.' The court performed the applicable four-step
analysis for cases involving public employees alleging retaliatory dis-
charge in violation of the right to free speech under the First Amend-
ment.87 This analysis requires, first, that the court "determine whether the
public employee's speech touches on a matter of public concern."8 Sec-
ond, the court must consider whether the "employee spoke as a citizen on
a matter of public concern" and if so, the court must "weigh 'the interests
of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern' against the State's interest 'as an employer in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees."'"
Third, following a determination that the plaintiffs speech interests out-
weigh the government's efficiency interests, the plaintiff must prove that
the speech was a key factor in the employee's termination.' And finally,








86. See id. at 1346-47.
87. See id. at 1346.
88. Id. (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1983)).
89. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568
(1968)).
90. See id. (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
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nation, the defendant must establish that the same decision to terminate
would have been reached absent the speech issue?'
In Cragg, the only relevant issue for consideration on appeal was the
question of efficiency, whether it was proper to restrict Mr. Cragg's
speech in order to allow the city to adequately deliver appropriate public
services.92 The city alleged that the efficiency interest at issue was that of
avoiding a "disruption" within the city." The city argued that Mr.
Cragg's political activities either resulted in, or had the potential to result
in, a disruption of the functions of the police department and therefore
rendered his actions subject to censorship. Yet the city failed to recog-
nize that neither the television advertisement nor the lawn sign indicated
that the Chief of Police was in support of the statements on the adver-
tisements." In balancing the interests of the parties, the court determined
that Mr. Cragg's actions (voicing his opinion on political candidates)
were at the center of protected speech, and concluded that Mr. Cragg's
speech interests tipped the balance in his favor.' Since the city failed to
prove that Mr. Cragg's actions caused any disruption to the efficient
functioning of the police department, Mr. Cragg's speech interests out-
weighed the city's efficiency interest.'
d. Analysis
The four-part free speech analysis, including the efficiency portion
of that analysis, is rooted in the need to protect speech and is implicated
in situations presenting competing social concerns such as those involv-
ing constitutionally guaranteed interests of individuals and the interests
of the city in fulfilling its obligations to its residents." In a series of em-
ployment cases," the Supreme Court established this test that provides
analytical guidelines for determining whether an employee has been im-
properly terminated in violation of his First Amendment rights. Balanc-




93. See id. at 1346-47.
94. See id. at 1347.
95. See id. at 1345.
96. See id. at 1346.
97. See id. at 1347.
98. See id. at 1346. The Supreme court has arrived at various interpretations and determina-
tions concerning these competing interests. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388
(1987) (balancing law enforcement employee's right to criticize the President's policy against state's
interest in promoting efficiency of public service); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150-53 (1983)
(balancing employer's interest in institutional efficiency against employee's right to circulate ques-
tionnaire); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569-72 (1968) (balancing employee's right to
comment on matter of public concern against employer's interest in efficiency).
99. See, e.g., Connick, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274 (1977); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 563.
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In Cragg, the Tenth Circuit considered the balance between the right
of free speech and the need for the government to operate smoothly-
two socially critical interests which, in this case, could not successfully
coexist. Although the elements of the analysis are clear, it is difficult to
assess which competing interest shall and should prevail for the better-
'ment of society." In the instant case, the court properly considered the
relationship between the two interests and weighed the merits of each
side. Although the competing interests in this case lean toward the pro-
tection of the individual because there was no disruption of city services,
the balancing test is not always so clear, and each situation is likely to
create a different result. The more closely balanced the interests are, the
more difficult it is to predict what interest a court might determine is
more valuable. In Cragg, however, the court provided a check on the
system by disciplining a government entity that stepped outside of its
own boundaries.
2. Other Circuits
There is considerable Supreme Court support for the efficiency analysis,'
which the circuit courts rely upon. Application of the efficiency analysis is an
attempt to streamline decisions in cases involving freedom of speech and public
officials by strictly applying a clearly defined analysis strucure." There is, how-
ever, no clear indication of how a court will nle given a specific set of facts. In
evaluating an immunity issue within the efficiency analysis, the Ninth Circuit has
stated that "under Pickering... a fact-sensitive, context-specific balancing of
competing interests, [will cause] the law regarding public-employee free speech
claims [to]... 'rarely, if ever, be sufficiently "clearly established" to preclude
qualified immunity."' Therefore, although there can be no clear outcome of the
balancing tests, the circuit courts are in accord in using the efficiency analysis to
structure the factual analysis. '- Thus, the Tenth Circuit's approach to factual situa-
tions involving freedom of speech and public officials corresponds to the approach
of other circuit courts.
100. See Voigt v. Savell, 70 F.3d 1552, 1560-61 (9th Cir. 1995).
101. Cf. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388; Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-51; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
102. This efficiency analysis arises from the Pickering balancing test and its progeny. Cf.
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574.
103. Brewster v. Board of Educ., 149 F.3d 971, 979-80 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Moran v.
Washington, 147 F.3d 839, 847 (9th Cir. 1998)).
104. A number of courts have used the Pickering balance test to determine which interest
weighed more heavily. See, e.g., McVey v. Stacy, 157 F.3d 271, 277-78 (4th Cir. 1998); Brewster,
149 F.3d at 981; McEvoy v. Spencer, 124 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 1997); Watters v. City of Philadel-
phia, 55 F.3d 886, 895 (3rd Cir. 1995); Bates v. Hunt, 3 F.3d 374, 377 (11 th Cir. 1993); Gonzales v.
Benavides, 712 F.2d 142, 146-47 (5th Cir. 1983).
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C. Retaliatory Discharge for Parallel Statutory Actions
1. Tenth Circuit-Roberts v. Roadway Express, Inc."
a. Case History
A jury found that Roadway Express retaliated against Roy Roberts in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.(6 The District Court for the District of Colorado granted Mr. Rob-
erts costs and reasonable attorneys' fees." Roadway alleged error on
numerous grounds, including refusal to grant judgment as a matter of law
for insufficiency of the evidence, exclusion of relevant evidence, and
admission of prejudicial evidence." The Tenth Circuit affirmed.'"
b. Facts
After more than twenty years as a truck driver and laborer for Road-
way Express, the company transferred Mr. Roberts from Kansas City to
Denver where he allegedly suffered racial harassment including two ra-
cially offensive notes, the "sabotag[ing]" of his truck by fellow employ-
ees, and general interference with his work."' Mr. Roberts complained to
his local supervisors and eventually formally complained to Roadway's
national headquarters."' After these complaints, Mr. Roberts's supervisor
subjected him to multiple disciplinary actions and eventual termination."'
Mr. Roberts filed suit in district court claiming he was subjected to a
hostile work environment and that his discharge had been retaliatory."3
Although he did not prove the hostile work environment claim, the jury
found Roadway retaliated against Mr. Roberts,"" and awarded damages
for emotional distress, punitive damages, and attorney's fees."
35
c. Decision
On appeal, Roadway claimed that Mr. Roberts presented insuffi-
cient evidence to support the jury finding of retaliation."' In evaluating
the sufficiency of the evidence of retaliation, the Tenth Circuit Court of
105. 149 F.3d 1098 (10th Cir. 1998).




110. Id. at 1102.
111. See id
112. See id. at 1102-03. The company later reinstated Mr. Robert's to his prior position after
union intervention. See id.
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Appeals applied the elements of a prima facie case of retaliation."7 Under
this test, Mr. Roberts needed to "establish that: (1) he engaged in pro-
tected opposition to discrimination; (2) he was subject to adverse em-
ployment action; and (3) that there exists a causal connection between
the protected activity and the adverse action.""' 8 Roadway alleged a fail-
ure to establish "(1) [that Mr. Roberts] suffered adverse employment
action; (2) that adverse action, if established, was causally connected to
his written complaint of March 1993; and (3) that he suffered compensa-
ble emotional distress.'" 9 The court stated that in order to establish that
the jury properly found the discharge retaliatory, "the issue [was]
whether [Mr.] Roberts presented sufficient evidence for the jury to de-
termine that adverse employment action was taken against him in re-
sponse to the protected activity."'" After engaging in a quasi-balancing
test to determine whether these elements were satisfied, the Tenth Circuit
determined that the jury findings on these elements were reasonable."' The
claim of racial discrimination that Mr. Roberts made to Roadway head-
quarters was protected activity." Following this claim, Roadway subjected
Mr. Roberts to numerous warning letters, suspensions, and eventually ter-
mination.'" And finally, the court found that these actions were by their
nature adverse" and, therefore, satisfied Mr. Roberts's requirement of
proof that he was subjected to adverse employment action.'"
In addressing whether Mr. Roberts established a sufficient causal
connection between his discharge and his claim of racial harassment, the
court recognized the competing interests of Mr. Roberts and Roadway."
Mr. Roberts's interest was his right to assert his claim of racial harass-
ment while Roadway had an interest in an maintaining an efficient busi-
ness. Roadway asserted that there was not a prima facie causal connec-
tion between the Mr. Robert's allegations and the termination, arguing
that the disciplinary actions imposed on Mr. Roberts were a result of the
application of workplace regulations.'27 The court, however, determined
117. See Sauers v. Salt Lake County, I F.3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir. 1993); cf Berry v. Stevinson
Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 987 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.10 (1981), and explaining that the evidence presented may be considered
by the trier of fact in determining whether the defendant's evidence rebuts plaintiffs prima facie
case).
118. Roberts, 149 F.3d at 1103.
119. Id. at 1104.
120. Id. at 1103.




125. See id.; see also Marx v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 76 F.3d 324, 329 (10th Cir. 1996); Berry v.
Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980,986 (10th Cir. 1996).




that because Roadway failed to raise the issue below, consideration of
the argument was not appropriate."
Finally, the Tenth Circuit held Roadway's claim that Mr. Roberts
failed to provide adequate grounds for compensatory damages without
merit." Roadway argued that since Mr. Roberts received compensation
under the Colorado Workers Compensation Act, he was not entitled to
any other remedy for emotional distress from a work-related injury.'"
The court quickly disposed of this issue under the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution,'3 ' recognizing that federal law entitled Mr.
Roberts to compensation for the work-related injury because a state
compensation law cannot preempt the federal law.'32 The court also held
that Roadway failed to prove that Mr. Roberts had already recovered
under state law for these injuries.'33 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit affirmed
the damage award ordered by the district court. "
d. Analysis
The Roberts court applied a test similar to the one used in Cragg,'
35
balancing the interest of Mr. Roberts to work in a environment void of
discrimination against Roadway's interest in requiring and enforcing
certain workplace standards. While the Cragg court balanced the effi-
ciency interest of the city government against individual rights,'" Roberts
indicates that a similar analysis may be applied in the private sector.
Roadway, much like a government, had an interest in efficiently operat-
ing its business and providing the best possible service to its customers,
while ensuring that its employees were not deprived of their rights as
citizens. Thus, after deciding the preliminary matters, such as whether
Mr. Roberts engaged in a protected activity and suffered adverse em-
ployment action,'37 the Tenth Circuit, under the guise of establishing a
causal action, '8 essentially applied a balancing test. The court applied an
efficiency analysis to determine if the actions of the alleged victim inter-
fered with the operation of the defendant employer and if so, whether the
need for public protection of these values outweighs the efficient opera-
tion of the employer's business.
128. See id.
129. Seeid. at ll05.
130. See id.
131. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2; see Roberts, 149 F.3d at 1104.
132. See Roberts, 149 F.3d at 1104; see also U.S. CONST. art VL cl. 2; Karcher v. Emerson
Elec. Co., 94 F.3d 502, 509 (8th Cir. 1996); Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184, 1190 (2d
Cir. 1987).
133. See Roberts, 149 F.3d at 1103.
134. See id.
135. Cragg v. City of Osawatomie, 143 F.3d 1343, 1346 (10th Cir. 1998); see supra notes 70-
100 and accompanying text (discussing the Tenth Circuit's decision in Cragg).
136. See Cragg, 143 F.3d at 1346.
137. See Roberts, 149 F.3d at 1104.
138. Cf. id.
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2. Tenth Circuit-Curtis v. Oklahoma City Public Schools Board
of Education'39
a. Case History
William Curtis filed an action against the Board of Education of the
Oklahoma City Public Schools, members of the board in their individual
capacity, and various supervisors,'" claiming harassment and retaliation
in violation of his First Amendment rights, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, and state law prohibiting retaliatory discharge and breach of
contract.' After determining that all but two of Mr. Curtis's expressions
relating to racial equality in the school district were not protected by the
First Amendment, 2 the district court granted a motion for judgment as a
matter of law for the defendants on Mr. Curtis's Title VII, state law re-
taliatory discharge, and contract claims.' 3 On appeal, Mr. Curtis argued
that the district court erred in ruling that certain speech was not protected
by the First Amendment." The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court in
part, holding that portions of the speech at issue were protected for pur-
poses of Mr. Curtis's civil rights and retaliatory discharge claims, but
affirmed all other issues.'5
b. Facts
Mr. Curtis alleged that he was discharged from his position as the
Equity/Affirmative Action Officer for the Oklahoma City Public Schools
in violation of state and federal law." Mr. Curtis's position involved the
implementation of a "model school system" with respect to equity and
affirmative action programs" and also provided a necessary communi-
cation link between various entities of the school system.'" In addition,
Mr. Curtis facilitated the Equity Committee, a committee established to
achieve desegregation goals. "'
After two years of employment with generally favorable evaluations,
Mr. Curtis began to have difficulty with a new supervisor and received
multiple reprimands for his performance." Mr. Curtis argued that these
actions were retaliatory, while the Board of Education claimed that Mr.
Curtis failed to meet deadlines and follow directives and thus did not
139. 147 F.3d 1200 (10th Cir. 1998).
140. See Curtis, 147 F.3d at 1205.
141. See id. at 1209.
142. See id. at 1205.
143. See id. at 1210.
144. See id. at 1205.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. Id. at 1207 n.2.
148. See id. at 1206-07.




comply with the requirements of his job."' Later, Mr. Curtis testified at a
School Board hearing, supporting a collegue's allegations of harassment
by her supervisor and accusing the same supervisor of racial harassment
directed at himself. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Curtis's supervisor placed him
on a plan to improve his work deficiencies.. and eventually terminated
Mr. Curtis on incompetence grounds." Prior to the termination, Mr.
Curtis testified before a grand jury regarding the harassment and filed a
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which
was eventually dismissed.'" Additionally, he presented a report to the
Equity Committee indicating that a group of schools in the district were
not successfully implementing the model school system.'5' In the time
between Mr. Curtis's testimony and his termination, the board responsi-




On appeal, the court considered two issues relevant to this survey.
The court first considered whether the First Amendment protected Mr.
Curtis's activities.'7 A government employee may not be terminated
based on a constitutionally protected activity."" Thus, the court recog-
nized that Mr. Curtis could not be terminated in retaliation for his testi-
mony concerning the alleged harassment or his other activities if they
constituted protected speech." Consistent with Supreme Court and Tenth
Circuit rulings, the court first considered whether the speech was "fairly
characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern."'"
Speech which is a matter of public concern is protected by the First
Amendment and the court must apply the Pickering balancing test."' If
the speech is solely a matter of personal concern, however, it is less
likely that a court will find support for its protection.
The court determined that the speech involved a matter of public
concern because it "directly concerned issues of public interest, including
whether there was equity in the Oklahoma City public schools."'' 2 Thus,
the court employed the Pickering balancing test in an effort to ascertain
whether Mr. Curtis's speech interest outweighed the School District's
151. Seeki.
152. See id.
153. Seeid. at 1209.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 1208-09.
156. See id. at 1208.
157. See id. at 1210.
158. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383 (1987).
159. See Curtis, 147 F.3d at 1211.
160. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); see Gardetto v. Mason, 100 F.3d 803, 811
(10th Cir. 1996). For a discussion of the Pickering balancing test, see supra note 74.
161. See Curtis, 147 F.3d at 1211.
162. Id. at 1212.
19991
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
interest in providing public services. 3 In accordance with prior Tenth
Circuit decisions,' the court considered whether restricting Mr. Curtis's
speech was necessary to provide adequate government services-in this
case, the efficient operation of the school system and the equity program
within the system." After applying the balancing test, the Tenth Circuit
determined that some statements did not receive protection under the
First Amendment for purposes of Mr. Curtis's retaliatory discharge
claim. The court found that Mr. Curtis's statements made prior to the
initiation of a new purpose for the Equity Committee, on which Mr.
Curtis served, were protected because they did not cause any disruption
to the efficient operation of the committee." Statements made following
this change, however, caused a disruption to the Equity Committee by
calling into question Mr. Curtis's ability to do his job.'67 Thus, the court
indicated that factual distinctions may provide differing results when
balancing efficiency interests.
d. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit continues to employ the Pickering balancing test
when considering whether the right to protected speech is implicated in a
retaliatory discharge claim. In doing so, the court balances the interest of
the employee in his right to free speech with the necessary functions of
government and the essential limitations on these functions. The American
system of government requires a delicate balance among all branches of
government as well as the protection of fundamental rights and liberties.
When the government is also an employer, there is potential for improper
interference and constraints upon these rights. In the instant case, for ex-
ample, the court addressed the possibility that the school board had used its
position of governmental power to chill the speech of an employee. Unlike
the decision in Cragg,"' the court found that portions of the employee's
speech did not require protection. The court also found that the interests of
the government outweighed those of the individual employee.' The court
found that the speech of the employee interfered with the relationship be-
tween different branches of the school system to the point of requiring a
check on this speech. Once again, individual courts are charged with
evaluating which interest is more deserving of protection, determining for
the people which interest is of more value to society.
163. See id. at 1212-13.
164. See, e.g., Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313, 1318 (10th Cir. 1986) (applying the Pickering
balancing test).
165. See Curtis, 147 F.3d at 1212.
166. See id. at 1213.
167. See id. at 1214.
168. Cragg v. City of Osawatonie, 143 F.3d 1343, 1346 (10th Cir. 1998).




The requirements of a retaliatory discharge claim, as applied by the
Tenth Circuit in Roberts," are consistent with Title VII requirements"' and
decisions in other circuits."' Determining the direction of the law, how-
ever, is difficult due to the unique factual circumstances of each case and
the nature of balancing tests which yield results based upon these fact-
specific situations.
Additionally, findings by the Roberts court, such as the criteria that
establish an adverse employment action,'73 are consistent with other cir-
cuits' rulings on these issues." The Eighth Circuit has determined that
items such as negative employment reports may lead to serious employ-
ment consequences, even termination, and are thus sufficient to establish
an adverse employment action."' In accordance with this definition, the
Roberts court found that Mr. Roberts's suspensions, temporary termina-
tion, and employment reports were adverse employment actions due to
their potential harm to Mr. Roberts.'76
The Roberts court also addressed whether the Colorado Workers
Compensation Act provided an exclusive remedy for work-related inju-
ries.'7 The court ruled consistently with the Second and Eighth Circuits
when it found that state law did not supersede Mr. Roberts's right to re-
covery under federal law. In Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc.,"' the Second
Circuit determined that a state workers compensation law barring recov-
ery under federal law was inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution."' In Karcher v. Emerson Electric Co.,' ' the Eighth Circuit
held that a state workers compensation law did not preempt the right to
recover for emotional distress created by a federal law."'
Despite the difficulty in finding a trend in decisions involving bal-
ancing tests between competing interests of the employer and the em-
170. See also Jeffries v. Kansas, 147 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Sauers v. Salt
Lake County, I F.3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir. 1993)); Sorensen v. City of Aurora, 984 F.2d 349, 353
(10th Cir. 1993); Williams v. Rice, 983 F.2d 177, 181 (10th Cir. 1993).
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
172. See, e.g., Artis v. Francis Howell N. Band Booster Ass'n, Inc., 161 F.3d 1178, 1182-83
(8th Cir. 1998); Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 768 (2d Cir. 1998); Hernandez-
Torres v. Intercontinental Trading, Inc., 158 F.3d 43, 46-47 (lst Cir. 1998); Parkins v. Civil Con-
structors of Ill., Inc., No. 98-1687, 1998 WL 909885, at *2(7th Cir. Dec. 30, 1998).
173. See Roberts v. Roadway Express, Inc., 149 F.3d 1098, 1104 (10th Cir. 1998).
174. See, e.g., Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1060-61 (8th Cir. 1997); Karcher v.
Emerson Elec. Co., 94 F.3d 502, 508-09 (8th Cir. 1996); Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d
1184, 1187-88 (2d Cir. 1987).
175. See Kim, 123 F.3dat 1060.
176. See Roberts, 149 F.3d. at 1104.
177. See id. at 1105.
178. 831 F.2dat 1184.
179. See id. at 1190; see also U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2.
180. 94 F.3d at 502.
181. See Karcher, 94 F.3d at 509.
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ployee,'" courts commonly attempt to provide adequate protection for
individuals. As exceptions to at-will employment develop, it is evident
that courts are attempting to protect and delineate valid public policies
and core goals. For example, the court in United States v. National Treas-
ury Employees Union'13 required that the government demonstrate more
than a mere threat of harm to the efficient functioning of the services they
provide.'" In doing so, the court expressed a clear intent to provide ade-
quate protection for certain core rights, such as free speech. In analyzing a
case alleging wrongful termination in violation of a valid public policy, a
court applies a balancing test, and in doing so, balances the needs of the
legal system in drawing a line around valid public policy exceptions--a
task, some would argue, that is better left to the legislature."
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit has consistently evaluated competing value inter-
ests and has done so in accordance with other circuits. Although the
trend involves recognition of the public policy exception to the concept
of at-will employment, there are "some courts [that] continue to refuse to
recognize a public policy exception."'" Retaliatory discharge claims in
violation of public policy have a well-defined set of analytical guidelines
that a court may use in balancing competing interests between the par-
ties; however, the results remain fact driven. It may be wise to establish
further guidelines by which a court can evaluate each situation, and es-
tablish legislation that defines what types of actions are protected and
which are not.
Elizabeth H. Confer*
182. See Fahey, supra note 74, at 556 n.16 (discussing the Pickering Court's determination that
there is not a standard against which statements by public employees can be judged); see also Bi-
netti, supra note 23, at 559 ("[Mhe opportunities for creative pleading of common law causes of
action, alleging limitations on the employer's discretion in the at-will employment setting, are le-
gion.... [Tihe legal landscape in which they practice surely will continue to present challenges to
their ingenuity.").
183. 513 U.S. 454 (1994).
184. See Fahey, supra note 74, at 598.
185. See generally Fahleson, supra note 2 (discussing the public policy exception and the
interaction between the judiciary and the legislature).
186. Binetti, supra note 23, at 560.
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